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Abstract
In this paper I first present a novel fact: women who have experienced democratic institu-
tions during their adolescence are more likely to participate in the labor market, keeping
constant the country, age and many other confounding factors. I then present evidence
suggesting that discriminatory attitudes may be a channel for such a finding. Other expla-
nations receive less support from the data.
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1 Introduction
The positive effects of good institutions can not be overstated. This paper aims at contribut-
ing to the literature of the positive consequences of inclusive institutions by showing how
they favor the female labor force participation, by reducing discriminatory attitudes toward
women, and toward immigrants.
The ideal experiment for uncovering the relationship between democratization and fe-
male labor participation would consist in assigning different young women to live in different
countries with different degree of democratization. Then, subsequently, at different points in
time, observing them and inquiring them about their labor force participation. Such an ex-
periment is unfeasible, also because often countries with different institutions have different
languages, making the random assignment unfeasible.
An easy way to understand the identification strategy of this paper is observing the evolu-
tion of the democratization of different countries, represented in Figure 1 and Figure 2, from
the 1900s to 2016.1 In the figures I consider Egypt, Spain, Afghanistan and Syria. We consider
two indicators of how democratic the institutions are. The first one is the polity score, and the
second one is the extent to which there are constraints on the executive. These series exhibit
both cross-sectional and time variation.
The series show that different cohorts of people will be exposed to different degree of de-
mocratization throughout their life. For instance, people born in the 1920s in Spain experience
in their 20s similar democratization rates than those people born in the 1990s, but different
crime rates than the people born in the 1940s. One can repeat a similar exercise across time
and space for every country that had some relevent regime transitions.
The main idea of the empirical strategy of this paper is exploiting such variation for iden-
tification purposes, to alleviate the concerns arising from purely cross-sectional comparisons.
There is a hypothesis in experimental psychology which has received considerably empir-
ical support according to which people between about 16 and 25 years old tend to be more
impressionable, and experiences lived during those ages tend to persist for a long period of
time (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989).
Therefore, it is possible to link the regime to which people were exposed during one of
their impressionable years, say, 18 years old, to data coming from the World Value Survey to
compute whether democratization matters for labor market outcomes.
1Data from Syria start in 1940.
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The same idea has been used by economists to identify, for instance, the effect of recessions
on preferences for redistribution (Giuliano and Spilimbergo , 2014), or the effect of recessions
on preferences for stock market participation (Malmendier and Nagel , 2011).
It should be noted that the specific timing of the regime transition and the intensity of the
transition are not easy to predict. Therefore, after accounting for the predictable part of the
series, the specific geographic, time and intensity differences of those series can be thought as
relatively quasi-random.
The starting point of this paper is the observation that female labor supply responds to the
experienced level of democratization. A standard deviation increase in the polity score raises
female labor participation by 1.2 percent of its mean, in the most demanding specification; a
standard deviation increase in the constraints of the executive variable increases female labor
supply by 2.8 percent of its mean.
In order to shed more light to the channels through which this happens I look at whether
attitudes toward women respond to the democratization level experienced during adoles-
cence. I first consider the most commonly used measure for attitudes toward women in the
labor market, the World Value Survey question: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right
to a job than women. I observe that people who experienced democracy while they were aged
18 years old are more likely to respond negatively to such a question.
Having established that attitudes may be a channel for such a response, I look at which
kind of attitudes may matter. I first consider discriminatory attitudes toward women and dis-
criminatory attitudes toward immigrants (regardless of the gender), and I find evidence that
those attitudes respond strongly to the type of institutions experienced during impressionable
years.
Another channel may be that people who experienced inclusive institutions may be less
conservative toward women in the workplace. However, when I look at conservatory atti-
tudes toward women in the workplace, I find that those attitudes are not responsive to the
experienced institutions during adolescence.
Motivated by the fact that some respondents may be concerned that the inclusion of
women in the workforce may push away the older people, I also look at attitudes toward
seniority, and I find that those attitudes are not responsive to the experienced institutions
during adolescence.
Another possibility may be that people who experienced inclusive institutions feel in gen-
eral more proactive toward work. Therefore, I consider attitudes toward work, regardless
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of gender, but I find that also those attitudes are not responsive to the experienced political
institutions during adolescence.
All in all, the body of evidence presented suggests that female labor participation is fa-
vored by having experienced inclusive political institutions, perhaps because people that
have had those democratic experiences tend to behave inclusively themselves, by having less
discriminatory attitudes.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to the litera-
ture on the consequences of democratization. While there is a large literature on the macro-
economic consequences of democratization, the one about micro-economic consequences (at
the individual level) is much smaller. Democratization has been shown to matter for social
capital (Muller and Seligson , 1994, Paxton , 2002) and inequality (Mueller and Stratmann ,
2003). By connecting female labor supply to political outcomes the paper is connected to the
literature focused on the relationship between female political representation (measured by
female voting or proportion of females in political power) and female labor force participation
(Iversen and Rosenbluth , 2007, 2006).
Second, it contributes to the growing literature focused on estimating the economic ef-
fects of experienced events during impressionable years (Giuliano and Spilimbergo , 2014,
Malmendier and Steiny , 2016, Malmendier and Nagel , 2011, 2015, Roth and Wohlfart , 2016,
Troiano , 2017). Economic conditions and inequality experiences experienced during impres-
sionable years have been shown to matter for economic and financial decisions and prefer-
ences for redistribution. Experiencing violent crimes has been shown to matter for social
capital and political behavior.
Third, it contributes to the literature on the economic effect of attitudes (Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales , 2006). Attitudes toward women have been shown to matter for the implemen-
tation of government programs intended to favor female labor participation such as mater-
nal leave (Givati and Troiano , 2012) and for fertility decisions (Ferna´ndez and Fogli , 2009),
among others. Tabellini (2008) and Tabellini (2010) suggest a mutual feedback between atti-
tudes of civic culture and good political institutions.
It is also important to note that attitudes and culture in general have been shown to mat-
ter for female labor supply, both by using cross-sectional variation and time series variation
(Fortin , 2005, Giavazzi, Schiantarelli and Serafinelli , 2013).
Finally, it contributes to the vast literature focused on the causes of female labor supply.
Summarizing the female supply literature is beyond the scope of this paper. Explanations
4
for the increase in female labor supply of the last century include: the rise in the gender gap
that encouraged many women to join the work force (Smith and Ward , 1985, Jones, Manuelli
and McGrattan , 2015), the increasing use of oral contraceptives that decreased the unwanted
pregnancies (Goldin and Katz , 2002), technological innovation that reduced the time to do
chores at home (Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu , 2004), more favorable attitudes toward
working women (Ferna´ndez, Fogli and Olivetti , 2004, Burda, Hamermesh and Weil , 2007)
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I present the data. In Section 3 the empirical
strategy is presented. In Section 4 the results are discussed. In Section 5 I conclude.
2 Data
2.1 Political Institutions Data
The data about how democratic a country is in a given year, from 1800 to 2016, come from
the Polity IV project (Polity IV , 2017). The Polity IV is the fourth edition of the Polity project,
whose main goal was to code the authority characteristics of states in the world system for
purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis (Eckstein and Gurr , 1975).
There are two main measures about how democratic a country is that we use for the pur-
pose of this study. The first one is the flagship measure: polity. The second one is the most
commonly used measure of the series, the constraints on the executive measure.
The polity score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic
country). It is the combination of two different measures, one about how democratic a coun-
try is, and another one about how autocratic a country is. The former measure gives weights
to: (i) the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effec-
tive preferences about alternative policies and leaders; (ii) the existence of institutionalized
constraints on the exercise of power by the executive; (iii) the guarantee of civil liberties to
all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. The latter measure gives
weights to: (i) sharp restriction or repression of competitive political participation; (ii) selec-
tion of chief executives within the political elite; (iii) exercise of power with few institutional
constraints.
The constraints on the executive score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive
parity or subordination). The variable refers to the extent to which the power of the chief
executives can be constrained by any accountability groups. Accountability groups could
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include legislatures, as is typical in Western democracies, or people in the ruling party (in one-
party state), council of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies, and, in many countries, a
strong independent judiciary system. The main goal of the measure is therefore to pick up
the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process (Polity IV
, 2017).
The previously described two variables are arguably the most commonly used to measure
democratic political institutions by political economy scholars, and among the very few that
are available since the 1800s.2 Because of the nature of the research design used in this paper,
it is very important to have data about political institutions that span far back in time, to
include survey respondents coming from as many generations as possible.
2.2 World Value Survey
I merge the information about political institutions, at 18 years old, to data coming from the
World Value Survey. I adopt the integrated 1981-2014 World Value Survey (World Value Survey
, 1981-2014). I measure whether the female respondent works with the following answers to
the following question:
Employment status: 1. Full Time; 2. Part Time; 3. Self Employed
I exclude from the respondents to the previous question women younger than 18 and
older than 70, but the results keeping those women in are stronger than the results that will
be presented later on.
The main question that has been used to measure labor market attitudes toward women
in previous studies (see for instance Givati and Troiano (2012)) is the following:
Do you agree with the following statement? When jobs are scarce, men should
have more right to a job than women.
I measure discrimination toward women with the answers to the following two questions:
“Do you agree with the following statement? University is more important for a boy than for a girl. ”
“Do you agree with the following statement? Men make better political leaders than women do. ”
2Another variable that has been commonly used to measure political institutions is the expropriation risk. How-
ever, the latter variable is available only starting in 1984, and this would significantly reduce the number of
generations included in this study, and its power, because values and beliefs tend to change slowly.
6
As general measures of discrimination I also consider the answers to the following two
questions, that deal specifically with discrimination toward foreigners, independently of the
gender: “Do you agree with the following statement? When jobs are scarce, jobs should be given to
local people. ” “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would
not like to have as neighbors? Immigrants. ”
It should be noted that I consider attitudes toward immigrants but I do not focus on the
immigrants as a group in this study. The main reason is that the question about whether the
respondent is an immigrant or not has been asked in limited years in the World Value Survey.
Limiting to the years where the question has been asked cuts the sample size by about 80
percent. Within the subset of years that the question has been asked, only about 2 percent
of the respondents reports to be born in a country different from the one where the survey
is being conducted: therefore I do not consider immigrants per se in this study, nor I exclude
them from the study, without too much loss of generality.
I measure conservative attitudes toward women with whether the respondent agrees with
the following two statements: “A woman has to have children to be fulfilled” and “Being a house-
wife just as fulfilling as working”.
I measure whether people are concerned with seniority with the answers to the following
question: “Do you agree with the following statement? When jobs scarce, older people should be
forced to retire.”.
Finally, I measure attitudes toward work in general, independently of gender, with whether
the respondent agrees with the following question: “Is work very important?”.
I summarize the variables used in this paper in Table 1.
3 Empirical Strategy
In this section, I outline the approach to estimate the consequences of experiencing inclusive
political institutions during adolescence.
The main idea of the empirical strategy is to associate to every respondent the measure of
how democratic the political institutions were when they were aged 18 years old. Control-
ling for country fixed effects alleviates the time-invariant concerns arising from geography;
controlling for year of the survey fixed effects alleviates the concerns for the space-invariant
time-specific shocks. I also control for age fixed effects, and age interacted linearly with year
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of the survey fixed effects, to account for the fact that for instance people as they age tend to
get more conservative. The baseline equation I estimate is the following:
Yict = α+ βPic + Gi + Ai + φc + φt + φt ∗ A + eict (1)
where Yict is the outcome of interest, α is the constant, Pic is the political institution variable
(when the survey respondent has 18 years old), Gi is the gender of the respondent, Ai are age
fixed effects, φc are country fixed effects, φt are the year of the survey fixed effects, φt ∗ A are
the interactions between the years of the survey fixed effects and age (entered linearly), and
eict are robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
An identification threat could be the possibility that age matters differently in different
countries. To account for this possibility I will always show, together with the baseline specifi-
cation, a specification that adds the interaction between country fixed effects and age (entered
linearly):
Yict = α+ βPic + Gi + Ai + φc + φt + φt ∗ A + φc ∗ A + eict (2)
where φc ∗ A are the interactions between the country fixed effects and age (entered lin-
early).
4 Main Results
In this section I will present the main results of the analysis.
In Table 2 I present the results of female labor supply. I find that in the most demanding
specification a standard deviation increase in the polity score at 18 years old makes female
labor participation higher by 1.2 percent of its mean; a standard deviation increase in the
constraints of the executive variable increases female labor supply by 2.8 percent of its mean.
To uncover whether attitudes may have a role in explaining this fact, I look at whether
the respondents think that if jobs are scarce, men should have priority compared to women.
I present those results in Table 3. I find that an increase of a standard deviation in the con-
straints of the executive variable increases the probability that the respondent thinks that men
should have the priority by about 2 percent of its mean.
Having established that attitudes may have a role in explaining this effect, I look at which
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kind of attitudes could matter. I look at four different kind of attitudes. Discriminatory atti-
tudes; conservative attitudes; attitudes toward the older workers; and attitudes toward work
in general. I find evidence that discriminatory attitudes are those that seem to respond to the
experienced institutions during adolescence.
I measure discriminatory attitudes with the answers to four questions. The first two are
targeted specifically toward women and measure discrimination during the education time,
and in leadership position. The latter two target immigrants, regardless of gender. I find
that all the four measures are very responsive to the type of institutions experienced during
adolescence. I present those results in Table 4 to Table 7. Specifically, I find that one standard
deviation increase in the constraints of the executive measure makes the probability of think-
ing that a university education is more important for a boy higher by 5 percent of the mean,
and that men make better political leaders by 2.6 percent of the mean. Additionally the same
standard deviation increase raises the probability of thinking that when jobs are scarce pri-
ority should be given to local by 1.5 percent of the mean, and the probability of not wanting
foreigners as neighbors by 5.3 percent of the mean.
A possibility is that people who experience inclusive institutions are more progressive,
and therefore more prone to accept working women. To test this hypothesis I measure con-
servative attitudes toward women with whether the respondents think that women need
children to be fulfilled, and whether the respondents think that being a housewife is just as
fulfilling as working regularly. I present those results in Table 8 and Table 9. I find that none
of these attitudes are affected by the experienced institutions during adolescence: coefficients
are typically small and statistically insignificant.
Another possibility is whether the respondents are concerned with increased labor force
participation because it would push the more senior people out of the labor force. In order to
shed light on this hypothesis I consider whether the respondents think that when there is job
scarcity, older people should be forced to retire. I present those results in Table 10. I find that
the responses to this question are not affected by the experienced political institutions during
adolescence.
Finally, I consider in Table 11 the possibility that attitudes toward work, in general, are
affected by the type of political institutions during adolescence, finding no evidence of that.
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5 Conclusion
Inclusive institutions matter positively for a number of macro-economic outcomes. Despite
this, the micro-economic consequences of inclusive institutions are largely neglected by the
existing literature but are an exciting field of research.
In this paper I considered the effect of inclusive institutions on female labor supply, finding
evidence that democratization makes the female participation in the labor market easier.
I then investigated the channels through which that happens, finding evidence support-
ing the view that democratization lowers discriminatory attitudes toward women and toward
immigrants. Other explanations, such as the possibility that conservativism or attitudes to-
ward the elderly change, receive less support from the data.
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Figure 1: Political Institutions Trends
-1
0
-5
0
5
P
ol
ity
 S
co
re
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
year
Egypt
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
P
ol
ity
 S
co
re
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
year
Spain
-1
0
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
P
ol
ity
 S
co
re
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
year
Afghanistan
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
P
ol
ity
 S
co
re
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
year
Syria
Notes: The polity score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic
country).
14
Figure 2: Political Institutions Trends
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Outcomes
Work - Females 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 130621
Priority Men 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 252384
University more Important for Boys 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 231364
Men Better Leaders 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 226374
Priority Local 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 236057
No Foreign Neighbors 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 243672
Women Need Children to be Fulfilled 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 115332
Being Housewife just as Fulfilling 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 237262
Old Should Retire 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 62631
Working is Very Important 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 256896
Other Variables
Polity Score at 18 years old 1.91 7.17 −10.00 10.00 270341
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old 4.61 2.29 1.00 7.00 264466
Notes: Work - Females is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the employment status of a female respon-
dent between 18 and 70 is the following: 1. Full Time; 2. Part Time; 3. Self Employed. Priority Men
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “When jobs
are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” University more Important for Boys is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “University is
more important for a boy than for a girl.” Men Better Leaders is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the re-
spondent agrees with the following statement: “Men make better political leaders than women do.”
Priority Local is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement:
“When jobs are scarce, jobs should be given to local people.” No Foreign Neighbors is a dummy vari-
able equal to 1 if the respondent mentioned “Immigrants” as an answer to the following question:
“On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to
have as neighbors?” Women Need Children to be Fulfilled is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respon-
dent agreed with the statement: “A woman has to have children to be fulfilled.” Being Housewife just
as Fulfilling is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agreed with the following statement:
“Being a housewife just as fulfilling as working.” Old Should Retire is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the respondent agreed with the following statement: “When jobs scarce, older people should be
forced to retire.” Working is Very Important is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent men-
tioned “very important” as an answer to the question “Is work very important?” The polity score
ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The constraints
on the executive score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).
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Table 2: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Probability Females Work
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work - Females Work - Females Work - Females Work - Females
Polity Score at 18 years old 0.00145 0.000726
(0.0010) (0.0011)
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old 0.00613∗ 0.00528∗
(0.0031) (0.0029)
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age No Yes No Yes
Observations 126473 126473 123739 123739
R2 0.186 0.194 0.187 0.195
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 90
and 88 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4).Work - Females is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
employment status of a female respondent between 18 and 70 is the following: 1. Full Time; 2. Part
Time; 3. Self Employed. The polity score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly
democratic country). The constraints on the executive score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7
(executive parity or subordination).
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Table 3: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Priority Men Priority Men Priority Men Priority Men
Polity Score at 18 years old -0.00134∗∗ -0.000960∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0004)
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old -0.00513∗∗∗ -0.00341∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0013)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age No Yes No Yes
Observations 250337 250337 244627 244627
R2 0.203 0.205 0.204 0.206
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 89
and 87 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). Priority Men is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
respondent agrees with the following statement: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right
to a job than women.” The polity score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly
democratic country). The constraints on the executive score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7
(executive parity or subordination).
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Table 4: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Univ. Imp. for Boys Univ. Imp. for Boys Univ. Imp. for Boys Univ. Imp. for Boys
Polity Score at 18 years old -0.00163∗∗∗ -0.00162∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old -0.00568∗∗∗ -0.00526∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0016)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age No Yes No Yes
Observations 229516 229516 224518 224518
R2 0.103 0.106 0.104 0.106
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 89
and 87 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). Univ. Imp. for Boys is a dummy variable equal to
1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “University is more important for a boy than
for a girl.” The polity score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic
country). The constraints on the executive score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity
or subordination).
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Table 5: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Better Leaders Men Better Leaders Men Better Leaders Men Better Leaders
Polity Score at 18 years old -0.00177∗∗∗ -0.00185∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004)
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old -0.00679∗∗∗ -0.00561∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0013)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age No Yes No Yes
Observations 224540 224540 219658 219658
R2 0.201 0.204 0.202 0.204
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is
89 and 87 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). Men Better Leaders is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “Men make better political leaders than
women do.” The polity score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic
country). The constraints on the executive score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity
or subordination).
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Table 6: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Priority Local Priority Local Priority Local Priority Local
Polity Score at 18 years old -0.00113∗∗ -0.00147∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004)
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old -0.00438∗∗∗ -0.00484∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0011)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age No Yes No Yes
Observations 235034 235034 229996 229996
R2 0.119 0.122 0.120 0.122
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 85
and 83 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). Priority Local is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
respondent agrees with the following statement: “When jobs are scarce, jobs should be given to local
people.” The polity score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic
country). The constraints on the executive score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive
parity or subordination).
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Table 7: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Foreign Neighbors No Foreign Neighbors No Foreign Neighbors No Foreign Neighbors
Polity Score at 18 years old -0.00115∗∗∗ -0.00128∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old -0.00486∗∗∗ -0.00512∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0014)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age No Yes No Yes
Observations 242164 242164 236597 236597
R2 0.123 0.125 0.123 0.125
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 88
and 86 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). No Foreign Neighbors is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the respondent mentioned “Immigrants” as an answer to the following question: “On this
list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as
neighbors?” The polity score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic
country). The constraints on the executive score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity
or subordination).
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Table 8: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Needs Children Needs Children Needs Children Needs Children
Polity Score at 18 years old -0.000790 -0.0000669
(0.0007) (0.0005)
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old -0.00260 -0.000662
(0.0021) (0.0015)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age No Yes No Yes
Observations 114351 114351 111508 111508
R2 0.213 0.216 0.214 0.217
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 66
and 64 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). Needs Children is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
respondent agreed with the statement: “A woman has to have children to be fulfilled.” The polity score
ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The constraints on
the executive score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).
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Table 9: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Housewife Fulfilling Housewife Fulfilling Housewife Fulfilling Housewife Fulfilling
Polity Score at 18 years old -0.000319 -0.000198
(0.0007) (0.0005)
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old -0.00176 -0.00146
(0.0019) (0.0014)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age No Yes No Yes
Observations 235334 235334 230074 230074
R2 0.103 0.106 0.103 0.106
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is
89 and 87 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). Housewife Fulfilling is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the respondent agreed with the following statement: “Being a housewife just as fulfilling as
working.” The polity score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic
country). The constraints on the executive score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity
or subordination).
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Table 10: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Old Should Retire Old Should Retire Old Should Retire Old Should Retire
Polity Score at 18 years old 0.000341 -0.000351
(0.0007) (0.0008)
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old -0.000241 -0.000516
(0.0022) (0.0025)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age No Yes No Yes
Observations 62239 62239 60338 60338
R2 0.117 0.120 0.117 0.121
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 49
and 48 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). Old Should Retire is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the respondent agreed with the following statement: “When jobs scarce, older people should be forced
to retire.” The polity score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic
country). The constraints on the executive score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity
or subordination).
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Table 11: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work Very Important Work Very Important Work Very Important Work Very Important
Polity Score at 18 years old 0.000250 0.000319
(0.0005) (0.0007)
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old -0.000463 -0.000162
(0.0015) (0.0015)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age No Yes No Yes
Observations 254858 254858 249107 249107
R2 0.116 0.119 0.116 0.119
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 89
and 87 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). Work Very Important is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the respondent mentioned “very important” as an answer to the question “Is work very important?”
The polity score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country).
The constraints on the executive score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or sub-
ordination).
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